Assessment of states' operating plans to combat pandemic influenza report to Homeland Security Council.
Homeland Security Council (U.S.)
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
Record modified: 2011-09-08
Record created: 2009-02-18
Title from title screen (viewed on January 28, 2008).; "January 2009."; Text in HTML format.
Extent: 1 v. (various pagings) : digital, PDF file
Abstract: Pandemic influenza could produce a public health emergency that is more daunting than any other type of naturally occurring, accidental, or terrorist-instigated event that our nation has experienced or is likely to experience. First, an influenza pandemic could affect essentially every community in the nation almost simultaneously - i.e., within the space of a few weeks - and, if comparable to or more severe than the influenza pandemic of 1918, could result in 25% or more of the population ultimately experiencing life-threatening illness and/or being forced to dispense with normal activities to care for victims. Second, response activities within each affected community not only will need to be sustained for several months, generally with little or no outside help, but also might be degraded due to substantial influenza-induced absenteeism across the participating entities - public and private. Third, coping with degraded functioning in virtually every\n aspect of society could be so demanding as to preclude the initiation of significant recovery activities for many months. Influenza pandemics, whether severe or comparatively mild, are recurring phenomena. The prevailing uncertainty therefore is not whether the world will experience another influenza pandemic but rather when the next one will occur and how severe it will be. And, considering that a catastrophic pandemic could be among the possibilities, thorough preparedness is imperative. The USG has done, is doing, and must continue to do much to lead the nation as it prepares for the next influenza pandemic. But the USG cannot do the job alone. Pandemic influenza preparedness by its nature must be a shared responsibility among all levels of government (local, State, and Federal), the private sector (for-profit and not-for-profit entities), and individuals and their households. Each entity must 1) understand its unique role (i.e., the ones that only it can fulfill) in\n preparing for, responding to and recovering from an influenza pandemic; and 2) address its respective challenges to the best of its abilities and resources. One uniquely important subset of preparedness partners comprises the Governments of the States, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Territories. This report discusses the status of their respective operating plans for performing critical State-level functions during and after an influenza pandemic.
Influenza, Human--prevention & control
Disease Outbreaks--prevention & control
Communicable Disease Control
OCLC No.: 300126565
Is part of: AHRQ publication ; no. 08-0018
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